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To what extent geopolitical tensions in major oil-producer countries and unexpected news related to the
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) a¤ect oil price? What are the e¤ects of non-
market externalities in oil price? Are oil price forecasters aware or a¤ected by such externalities when making
their predictions? In this article, I analyse the inuence of these events on oil price by means of Granger
causality, using an unique measure accounting for these events (2001-12). I found evidence favouring OPEC
countries-related news as an oil price driver, inuencing short-term forecasts, and reducing the consensus
when unanticipated news are available.
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1. A complex market
There is a wide range of research analysing
the oil market beyond the boundaries of Eco-
nomics. Perhaps, oil uniqueness for the energy
matrix of industrialised economies and their
remotely located producers, attracts the atten-
tion of as many elds with di¤erent viewpoints
to analyse.
From an economic perspective, the under-
standing of any market relies hugely on the
e¤ect of agents behaviour on the equilibrium
dynamics. Some specic cases, such as the oil
market, would include issues concerning indus-
trial organisation, natural resources sustain-
ability, externalities, and other complexities
a¤ecting its evolution. In particular, the oil
market is characterised as a market with big
global playersin the supply and demand side
whose behaviour more than often threaten the
worlds production chain and even political
and nancial stability. Moreover, big players
from the supply side carry the unpleased label
of a worldwide recognised cartel (see Gri¢ n
and Xiong, 1997; Gülen, 1997; Jones, 1990;
and Kaufmann et al., 2004 for details).
Big oil producers, i.e. oil exporter countries,
have taken a step further on their industrial or-
ganisation by creating the Organisation of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Es-
tablished in Baghdad, Iraq, and e¤ective since
E-mail: lexcm6@nottingham.ac.uk.
January 1961, the main aim of OPEC is "to co-
ordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its
Member Countries and ensure the stabilisation
of oil markets in order to secure an e¢ cient,
economic and regular supply of petroleum to
consumers, a steady income to producers and
a fair return on capital for those investing in
the petroleum industry." (OPEC, 2012). The
organisation includes, as for 2014, twelve coun-
tries primarily located in the Middle East and
Africa, plus two Latin American members. As
an organisation under statutes, each mem-
ber has to continuously full several require-
ments concerning production and operations
data reporting; a full commitment towards
OPEC policy mandates. This obviously leads
to think that OPEC acts coordinate into set-
ting quotas, prices, or any other market dis-
tortion.
OPECs e¤ective power has been analysed
thoroughly from an economic point of view
by researches and policy makers.2 Many
and diverse events have occurred since
OPEC establishmentmainly wars and polit-
ical instability, there is no current consensus
about the role of OPEC as price setter. Most
remarkably, Almoguera et al. (2011) suggest
2It is worth mentioning that abstracting from all non-
economic issues, there are two notable researchers that
has moving forward the econometrics of oil price : Pro-
fessor Lutz Kilian (University of Michigan, US) and
Professor James Hamilton (University of California,
San Diego, US).
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that the ability of OPEC to set prices since
its creation is rather episodic. They nd that
during the period from 1974 until 2004, OPEC
acts as Cournot competition when sharing
global market with non-OPEC oil producers.
Their empirical results, as the authors argue,
are in favour of specic but non time-robust
price rises due to OPEC compared to the com-
petition price level.
From the demand side it is unlikely that big
consumers were trying to confront deliberately
the suggested OPEC behaviour. According
to energy statistics from CIA World Factbook
(2014), the ten major oil consumer countries
are: United States, China, Japan, India, Rus-
sia, Brazil, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Canada,
and South Korea. As the evidence on OPECs
behaviour is inconclusive, neither of this di-
verse list of countries has been associated spe-
cically against OPEC in a regular basis, des-
pite the United Nations World Trade Organ-
isation (UN-WTO) surveillance for fair trade.3
In terms of what extent OPEC sets prices and
whether the e¤ects of non-market externalit-
ies in oil spot price are adverse are question-
able as well as oil price forecasters being aware
of externalities when making their predictions.
All these questions are certainly important for
a broad group of policymakers, from global-
based organisations to specic central bankers
ghting imported ination.
In this article, I provide some answers to these
questions by means of econometric data ana-
lysis. However, despite all the machinery that
has been used in regard to OPEC behaviour,
I proceed considering one of the most striking
time-series econometrics tools: Granger caus-
ality (Granger, 1969).
3A tasty ingredient has been recently added to this
never-ending course. In 11 September 2014, US Sec-
retary of State John Kerry meets Saudi King Abdullah
in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in which is argued to be a
coordination against oil price rises due to Middle East
tensions. Moreover, this rise could help Russia to n-
ance few economic sanctions imposed by the US and
EU. See The DailyMirror, 31 October, 2014: Oil Polit-
ics: The Secret US-Saudi Deal for a review.
2. Does Sir Clive Granger cause all this?
The notion of Granger causality is as simple as
usefuland di¤erent to "ordinary" causality. It
states that if lagged values of a variable xt pre-
dict current values of another variable yt, and
that forecast includes lags of xt as well as yt,
then xt Granger cause yt (xt ! yt). Formally,
this corresponds to test if all the lags of xt are
jointly statistically signicant in the following
regression:
yt = +
pyX
i=1
iyt i +
pxX
j=1
jxt j + "t; (1)
where lags of yt controls for autocorrelation,
f;;;2"g are parameters to be estimated
(with, say, ordinary least squares), and "t
is a white noise. The autoregressive orders
(py; px) can be chosen according to an appro-
priate model selection criterion such as meas-
ures based in the Kullback-Leibler informa-
tion criterion (i.e. Akaike and Schwarz) or
the General-to-Specic (GETS) methodology.
Statistical inference is carried out by testing
the joint null hypothesis H0 : 1 = ::: = px =
0 (xt do not Granger cause yt). The vector
that contains the restrictions is F -distributed
with (px; T   (py + px + 1)) degrees of free-
dom (T is the sample size). For a simple,
and rather humorous example on the mech-
anics of Granger causality, see Thurman and
Fisher (1988).4
3. Gettinjiggy witit
By means of Granger causality I provide evid-
ence on the following hypothesis: (NH1)
Do geopolitical tensions and announcements
("news") concerning OPEC countries (labelled
GT&N) a¤ect the oil spot price (POil)?,
(NH2) Do these tensions a¤ect oil price fore-
casts (E[POil])?, and (NH3) Do these tensions
a¤ect the consensus (POil) of market ana-
lysts forecasts of oil price?.
It is expected that NH1 : GT&N ! POil
and NH2 : GT&N ! E[POil]. But, in or-
der to conclude about its reliability, the inverse
4Nevertheless, probably this nding does not cause Sir
Clive Grangers fun, as in regard of Granger causality
in his Nobel Lecture of 2003 states: "Of course, many
ridiculous papers appeared." (Granger, 2003, p. 366).
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should not be true for both assumptions. The
inverse negative NH1, POil 9 GT&N , sup-
poses that the current oil price does not drive
disturbances in OPEC countries. Also, if the
expectations measure do not concern OPEC
members, it should be follow that E[POil] 9
GT&N . But, it is allowed for forecasters to
consider actual values of oil price as an in-
dicator of future values. Hence, the following
auxiliary hypothesis emerges, ANH : POil !
E[POil]. Finally, associated with greater ten-
sions is the uncertainty about future values of
oil price. For that reason, it is expected that
GT&N ! POil, but the inverse should not
hold.
Basically, these hypotheses are posed to test if
OPEC countries a¤ects oil price, its forecasts,
and the consensus surrounding those forecasts.
The analysis requires a reliable (and simple)
quantitative measure of geopolitical tensions
and news measuring unexpected shocks about
OPEC countries. Note that I bring forecasters
into analysis for a matter of robustness.
In order to isolate the pure OPEC announce-
ment e¤ect, I use two measures of the GT&N
variable, one containing all what happened
with OPEC countries, including political in-
stabilities plus purely OPEC announcements;
and a second one excluding the specic OPEC
behaviour.
3.1. Data
The analysis is made considering a time span
ranging from 2001.1 until 2012.3 (135 observa-
tions); in monthly frequency. The GT&N is
constructed by considering the sum of twelve
daily variables, each one a dummy variable in
which the value of one is assigned to an unex-
pected event. The events include: UN Oil for
Food Program (1995-2003), US relations with
Libya and Iran (1996-2004), Iraq War (2003),
Iraq post Iraq War (2003-11), Iran post Iraq
War (start in 2005), terrorist attacks, Lebanon
War (2006), Arab Spring (2011), use of the
US Strategic Petroleum Reserve, non-OPEC
countries oil-related news, new announcements
on discoveries and site exploration, and purely
OPEC announcements (see López and Muñoz,
2012, for details). The sources of these vari-
ables are Bloomberg, The Wall Street Journal,
Financial Times, and the US Energy Inform-
ation Administration. These twelve variables
are added to make a monthly variable which
contain an integer with the number of events
and news. This variable is not transformed to
a binary one to preserve intensity.
The oil price (POil) corresponds to the annual
percentage change of the Brent oil price, meas-
ured in USD per barrel (source: Bloomberg).
The expectations (E[POil]) corresponds to the
annual percentage change of the 12-months-
ahead forecast contained in the monthly Con-
sensus Forecasts (CF) report. The point es-
timator reported in the CF report corresponds
to the mean of the answers ranging 65-70 re-
spondents. Each report also shows the max-
imum and the minimum point value repor-
ted by respondents (E[pHigh] and E[pLow], re-
spectively). Hence, the di¤erence POil =
E12[pHigh pLow] E3[pHigh pLow], where E
is the forecast at  months, measure the de-
gree in which the consensus is achieved; while
greater the uncertainty is, smaller the con-
sensus achieved. Hence, it is expected that
GT&N ! POil.
Figure 1 exhibits all the variables considered in
the analysis: GT&N (in bars), oil price POil,
expectations E[POil], and consensus POil. It
is adverted a major number of disturbances
during 2001 to mid 2005, and during the 2011-
2 period.
3.2. Results
The results report the outcome of the F test
of global signicance, comprising only the val-
ues i of Equation 1. In concrete, it tests the
null hypothesis H0 : 1 = ::: = px = 0, for
each NH1-3 and ANH given 1 to 4 lags of the
xt variable. The lag structure of yt is chosen
according to the GETS procedure, allowing
skipped terms. The estimations are made with
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
The results are reported in Table 1. Note
that for the rst lag, in all cases there is
evidence favouring OPEC countries-related
news as an oil price driver, inuencing short-
term forecasts, and reducing the consensus
when unanticipated news are available. The
rst panel of Table 1 suggests some evidence
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of OPEC-related disruptions inuencing oil
prices when 1 and 4 lags of are used, at 10%
level of condence. The unexpectedness of the
events comprising the GT&N variable gives
the characteristic of short memory behaviour.
Hence, what it is important of this nding
is that it is signicant with one GT&N lag.
Moreover, the hypothesis that POil Granger
causes disturbances in OPEC countries is ut-
terly rejected.
The second and third panel are plainly in fa-
vour of the OPEC-related behaviour towards
expectations and forecast uncertainty. Despite
of the results with four lags for NH3, there
is evidence supporting these results whilst no
evidence was found against. The fourth panel
is used a matter of robustness. It states that
the current oil price acts as an input for the
forecasters, as it naturally should be. But also
it reveals that the market does not follow a
self-fullling price scheme; at least with exo-
genous forecasts as the CF are. It is most
likely, in the light of results, that oil price fore-
casts coming from OPEC producers could have
an implication for future prices; topic left for
further advances.
What happens when excluding the OPEC be-
haviour from GT&N variable? Previous res-
ults are spoiled (nding bidirectional Granger
causality), favouring the hypothesis of purely
OPEC news as a price driver.
4. Wrapping up
To what extent oil producers and political dis-
turbances in oil exporter countries a¤ect global
oil price? By means of Granger causality I
provide evidence favouring OPEC countries-
related news as an oil price driver, inuencing
short-term forecasts, and reducing the con-
sensus when unanticipated news are available.
These results are important since oil has been
long-standing one of the most important com-
modities worldwide for an incommensurable
number of reasons. Large uctuations of its
price are associated with detrimental welfare
e¤ects for both producers and consumers.
This article suggests that in order to keep track
of price dynamics it is recommended to get to
follow geopolitical tensions and the coordin-
ated actions of the associated major produ-
cers. This task is easier said than done, since
it relies on non-market signals and other ex-
ternalities that are not necessarily based on a
purely economics-based logic.
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Figure 1: Time series plot of the variables (*)
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Brent P(Oil) CF P(Oil) h=12 CF Dispersion [RHS]
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
B
asis
points
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GT&N-NO GT&N-OTerrorist attacks
Lebanon War
Arab SpringIraq War
N
um
be
r
of
ev
en
ts
N
um
ber
of
events
A: Brent Oil Price, CF P(Oil), and CF Dispersion
B: Geopolitical Tensions and OPEC-related News
(*) The GT&N variable is dened as GT&N = GT&N -NO +GT&N -O. Source: Authors
elaboration using data from Bloomberg, CF, and López and Muñoz (2012).
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Table 1: Granger causality testing results: all events (*)
Baseline model: yt = +
pyP
i=1
iyt i +
pxP
j=1
jxt j + "t; "t  iidN (0; 2")
NH: 1 = ::: = px = 0 (xt 9 yt)
NH1: GT&N ! POil NH1 Inverse: POil ! GT&N
Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc. Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc.
1 3.606 0.060 0.826 ! 1 0.000 0.989 0.117 9
2 1.988 0.141 0.826 9 2 0.104 0.901 0.112 9
3 1.342 0.263 0.825 9 3 0.073 0.974 0.105 9
4 2.027 0.094 0.825 ! 4 0.444 0.777 0.103 9
NH2: GT&N ! E[POil] NH2 Inverse: E[POil]! GT&N
Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc. Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc.
1 4.434 0.037 0.898 ! 1 0.712 0.400 0.120 9
2 4.020 0.020 0.899 ! 2 0.395 0.675 0.116 9
3 2.704 0.048 0.898 ! 3 1.166 0.326 0.119 9
4 2.480 0.047 0.900 ! 4 1.379 0.245 0.117 9
5 1.979 0.086 0.899 ! 5 1.145 0.341 0.109 9
6 1.639 0.142 0.898 9 6 1.372 0.231 0.119 9
NH3: GT&N ! E[POil] NH3 Inverse: E[POil]! GT&N
Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc. Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc.
1 3.049 0.083 0.160 ! 1 1.007 0.317 0.128 9
2 2.451 0.090 0.176 ! 2 1.657 0.195 0.125 9
3 2.280 0.082 0.172 ! 3 1.238 0.299 0.119 9
4 1.716 0.150 0.167 9 4 1.093 0.363 0.117 9
Auxiliary NH: POil ! E[POil] Auxiliary NH Inverse: E[POil]! POil
Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc. Lags (px) F -stat. p-value R
2
Reg. Infrc.
1 8.354 0.004 0.918 ! 1 0.569 0.452 0.843 9
2 16.151 0.000 0.933 ! 2 0.932 0.396 0.843 9
3 12.219 0.000 0.934 ! 3 0.646 0.587 0.841 9
4 9.810 0.000 0.934 ! 4 0.466 0.760 0.844 9
(*) OLS estimations with Newey-West HAC standard errors. Sample: 2001.12012.3 (135 obs.).
p-value: bold<10%; italics>10%. Source: Authors elaboration.
